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MISSING THE MARK: NYSRPA AS A 
VEHICLE TO CLARIFY 




Federal mootness doctrine provides little guidance and 
predictability,1 and the Court’s vacillation between constitutional and 
prudential mootness is largely to blame.2 The two approaches to 
mootness differ in important respects: Constitutional mootness treats 
mootness as a constitutional mandate that precludes exercising 
jurisdiction,3 while prudential mootness relies on discretion4 and 
practical considerations such as courts’ equity powers, efficiency, and 
economy.5 In some cases, outcomes “may depend on whether the 
mootness bar is understood as a prudential or constitutionally 
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 1.  Matthew I. Hall, The Partially Prudential Doctrine of Mootness, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
562, 564 (2009) (“Mootness doctrine, as currently constituted, does not provide the analytic tools 
necessary to explain or predict the results in a large number of mootness cases.”). 
 2.  See id. at 562 (arguing that mootness “lacks a coherent theoretical foundation” given the 
Court’s vacillation between constitutional and prudential mootness). 
 3.  Id. at 571–72. 
 4.  BRIAN T. YEH, CONG. RES. SERV., RS22599, MOOTNESS: AN EXPLANATION OF THE 
JUSTICIABILITY DOCTRINE, 4 (2007) (citing Chamber of Com. v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 627 F.2d 
289, 291 (D.C. Cir. 1980)) (noting that, unlike constitutional mootness, prudential mootness 
“address[es] not the power to grant relief but the court’s discretion in the exercise of that power”). 
 5.  Hall, supra note 1, at 609 (noting that prudential factors include, at least, “(1) whether 
the policies that are typically said to be served by justiciability doctrines are sufficiently satisfied 
under the circumstances of the case; (2) the importance of adjudicating the issue or issues 
promptly; (3) the effect on judicial authority of hearing and deciding the claim; and (4) the effect 
on the efficient use of judicial resources of hearing and deciding the claim”). 
HATEM_03_10_21_FORMATTED (DO NOT DELETE) 3/10/2021  9:41 PM 
2021] CONSTITUTIONAL & PRUDENTIAL MOOTNESS & NYSRPA 237 
mandated doctrine.”6 Often, the Court’s inconsistent use of 
constitutional and prudential mootness produces “dramatic variations 
in jurisdictional analysis” and results.7 
In New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. City of New 
York (“NYSRPA”), New York City residents challenged in federal 
court a New York City (“City”) ordinance that barred firearms 
transport across city lines to second homes and shooting ranges.8 The 
Southern District of New York found that the law minimally burdened 
Petitioners’ Second Amendment rights and subsequently dismissed the 
complaint.9 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the 
decision, and Petitioners subsequently sought certiorari from the 
Supreme Court.10 But three months after the Court granted cert,11 the 
City amended its ordinance to allow licensed firearms transport to non-
City secondary homes and shooting ranges.12 New York State then 
enacted a law prohibiting cities from adopting restrictions on licensed 
transport.13 In response to these developments, the City filed a 
Suggestion of Mootness with the Court.14 And in 2020, the Court held 
that the City’s and State’s regulatory amendments had mooted the 
case.15 
This paper will analyze NYSRPA in light of the dichotomous 
federal mootness framework, assessing how NYSRPA engages with the 
constitutional and prudential mootness distinction. Ultimately, 
NYSRPA was a missed opportunity to clarify lingering uncertainties in 
mootness doctrine. The opinion did not mention or adopt either 
formulation outright, though the Court’s reasoning appeared to affirm 
constitutional mootness as the basis for its decision. Still, NYSRPA 
 
 6.  Id. at 564.  
 7.  Gene R. Nichol Jr., Moot Cases, Chief Justice Rehnquist, and the Supreme Court, 22 
CONN. L. REV. 703, 714 (1990). 
 8.  38 R.C.N.Y. § 5-23(a)(3) (2019). 
 9.  New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. City of New York, 86 F. Supp. 3d 249, 268 
(S.D.N.Y. 2015), aff’d sub nom. New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. City of New York, 
883 F.3d 45 (2d Cir. 2018), vacated and remanded sub nom. New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, 
Inc. v. City of New York, New York, 140 S. Ct. 1525 (2020).  
 10.  Petition for Writ of Certiorari for Plaintiffs-Appellants, New York State Rifle & Pistol 
Ass’n, Inc. v. The City of New York, 140 S. Ct. 152 (2020) (No. 18-280). 
 11.  N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc., 883 F.3d at 53–54 (2d Cir. 2018), cert. granted, N.Y. 
State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. City of New York, 139 S. Ct. 939 (2019). 
 12.  38 R.C.N.Y. § 5-23(a)(3) (2019). 
 13.  N.Y. Penal Law § 400.00(6) (2019). 
 14.  Suggestion of Mootness, N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. City of New York, 883 
F.3d 45 (2019) (No. 18-280), 2019 WL 3451573. 
 15.  N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. City of New York, 140 S. Ct. 1525, 1526–27 (2020) 
(per curiam).  
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could serve as a springboard to clarify and constitutionalize mootness 
doctrine in line with the Court’s existing jurisprudence. To make sense 
of how NYSRPA fits into the Court’s jurisprudence, this Note will 
proceed as follows: Part I describes the Court’s basic mootness 
framework. Part II analyzes inconsistencies caused by flip-flopping 
between the mootness approaches and juxtaposes two affirmative 
action cases to illustrate how the Court’s mootness jurisprudence has 
produced different jurisdictional outcomes for similarly situated 
plaintiffs. Part III addresses the Court’s use of these approaches in the 
related field of standing because, like mootness, prudential and 
constitutional elements of standing are muddied. Part IV focuses on 
NYSRPA and its doctrinal significance, and Part V argues for the 
adoption of the more predictable constitutional approach as the 
framework for federal mootness decisions. 
I. BACKGROUND 
Mootness is but one element of Article III courts’ jurisdiction 
inquiry. To exercise Article III jurisdiction, a case must present a proper 
case or controversy.16 Absent a live case or controversy, a court’s 
opinion would be merely advisory, thereby violating the court’s 
constitutional mandate.17 However, the Court has emphasized 
flexibility in the mootness doctrine and carved out three exceptions to 
mootness: voluntary cessation, capable of repetition yet evading review, 
and class actions.18 Where an exception is satisfied, the court may 
exercise jurisdiction. Section A describes the basic mootness inquiry 
and its deeply intertwined sister doctrine, standing, and Section B 
focuses on mootness exceptions. 
A. Current Legal Framework 
It is impossible to discuss mootness without briefly explicating the 
basic standing requirements. Mootness is often described as “standing 
in a time frame.”19 A legal interest must exist at the start of litigation 
 
 16.  Daimler Chrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 341 (2006) (holding where “a dispute is 
not a proper case or controversy, the courts have no business deciding it, or expounding the law 
in the course of doing so”).  
 17.  See Hall v. Beals, 396 U.S. 45, 48 (1969) (“The case has therefore lost its character as a 
present, live controversy of the kind that must exist if we are to avoid advisory opinions on 
abstract propositions of law.”). 
 18.  ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 98–101 (3d ed. 2009). 
 19.  U.S. Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 397 (1980) (quotation omitted). 
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(standing) and must be “live” until the case is resolved (mootness).20 
Standing requires (a) injury to a personal right that is both 
“concrete and particularized” and “actual or imminent, not conjectural 
or hypothetical;” (b) a causal connection between the injury and the 
challenged conduct; and (c) a “likelihood that the injury will be 
redressed by a favorable decision.”21 The standing injury requirement 
is often referred to as a personal stake.22 Mootness doctrine adds a 
temporal requirement to that personal stake: To overcome mootness, 
the personal stake or interest must be extant at all stages of review, not 
just at the time the complaint is filed.23 Without such interest, the court 
may not exercise jurisdiction and the case must be dismissed on 
mootness grounds. 
With respect to the personal stake requirement, the Court has 
distorted the doctrine to decide questions of political and normative 
importance.24 In Roe v. Wade, plaintiff McCorvey was no longer 
pregnant when the case reached the Court;25 thus, her personal stake in 
the outcome had since expired.26 Forced to operate within the confines 
of existing personal stake precedent, the Court engaged in analytical 
acrobatics to reach the merits.27 The Court held that, because 
McCorvey could become pregnant again, pregnancy was capable of 
repetition yet evading review.28 However, most women of a 
childbearing age may become pregnant at some point, so the proffered 
personal stake was really a generalized grievance.29 In reaching the 
 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  N.E. Fla. Chapter of Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville, 508 
U.S. 656, 663–64 (1993). 
 22.  ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 63 (7th ed. 2016) (using “personal 
stake” to discuss whether the personally suffered injury requirement is met).  
 23.  Mootness in the Supreme Court, 88 HARV. L. REV. 373, 376 (1974) (“Mootness questions 
arise only once a court has determined, usually implicitly, that a litigant has standing to bring the 
action the doctrine of mootness requires that ‘an actual controversy must be extant at all stages 
of review, not merely at the time the complaint is filed.’”) (citing Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 
452, 459 n.10 (1974)). 
 24.  Evan Tsen Lee, Deconstitutionalizing Mootness, 105 HARV. L. REV 605, 631 (1992). 
 25.  Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 125 (1973).  
 26.  Id. at 171 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that exercise of jurisdiction requires a 
pregnant woman in her first trimester because plaintiffs cannot vindicate others’ rights). 
 27.  See Tsen Lee, supra note 24, at 631 (“It is unfortunate that the majority was forced to 
this kind of rationalization merely because it had the good sense not to deny the importance of 
the merits of those cases and because previous cases had frozen the personal stake requirement 
into Article III.”). 
 28.  Roe, 410 U.S. at 125. 
 29.  Tsen Lee, supra note 24, at 624 (“[H]er personal stake could not have been the 
protection of her right to obtain an abortion in the future, because this stake ultimately collapses 
into a generalized grievance.”).  
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merits on what amounts to a generalized grievance, the Roe Court 
essentially made an exception to the personal stake requirement.30 
Similarly, the Court in United States Parole Commissioner v. 
Geraghty offered a broad interpretation of the requirement. In that 
case, the Court acknowledged that the named plaintiff’s personal stake 
in the outcome was moot but found a personal stake in the procedural 
decision—class certification—satisfactory.31 This rationale plainly 
deviated from precedent and the spirit of the requirement; it made little 
sense to find a personal stake not grounded in the litigation itself.32 
Thus, the Court warped the definition of personal stake to decide an 
issue of constitutional and normative import: the fair treatment of 
inmates.33 In the opinion, the Court even recognized that its reasoning 
deviated from formalistic Article III requirements,34 noting that 
Geraghty was not the first justiciability decision to suffer from this 
infirmity.35 
B. Exceptions to Mootness 
Within this framework, the Court has carved out three exceptions 
to mootness: (1) voluntary cessation, (2) capable of repetition yet 
evading review, and (3) class action lawsuits.36 Where an exception 
applies and jurisdiction is otherwise satisfied, the Court may reach the 
merits of the dispute. 
 
 30.  Id. See also Hall, supra note 1, at 564 (arguing the plaintiff in Roe failed to demonstrate 
the likelihood of being subjected to the same conduct).   
 31.  U.S. Parole Comm’r v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 402 (1980) (“We think that in 
determining whether the plaintiff may continue to press the class certification claim, after the 
claim on the merits expires, we must look to the nature of the personal stake in the class 
certification claim.”) (internal quotations omitted).  
 32.  Tsen Lee, supra note 24, at 625 (noting that the plaintiff would have no personal stake 
in class certification, “other than the satisfaction of inflicting a wound on the ‘system’ that 
wounded him”).  
 33.  See id. at 624 (“[T]he Court was straining to find a way to review the denial of 
certification.”).   
 34.  See Geraghty, 445 U.S. at 404 n.11 (“Our point is that the strict, formalistic view of Art. 
III jurisprudence, while perhaps the starting point of all inquiry, is riddled with exceptions. And, 
in creating each exception, the Court has looked to practicalities and prudential considerations. 
The resulting doctrine can be characterized, aptly, as ‘flexible;’ it has been developed, not 
irresponsibly, but ‘with some care,’ including the present case.”) (citations omitted).  
 35.  See id. (“The erosion of the strict, formalistic perception of Art. III was begun well 
before today’s decision.”).  
 36.  ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 123 (4th ed. 
2011). 
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1.  Voluntary Cessation 
The voluntary cessation exception provides that a case is not moot 
if “the defendant voluntarily ceases the alleged improper behavior but 
is free to return to it at any time.”37 The court may discern an intent to 
reinstate a challenged provision from pleadings38 or other conduct.39  
For example, in Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental 
Services, Inc.,40 the defendant-company dumped excessive mercury 489 
times.41 The Court cited this past “continuous and pervasive conduct” 
in its assessment of the reasonable likelihood that the conduct would 
reoccur.42 In determining the likelihood that challenged conduct will 
resume, the Court applies a “stringent” standard:43 A case is moot only 
“if subsequent events make it absolutely clear that the allegedly 
wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur.”44 
Governments, unlike natural persons, are accorded some deference. 
Barring contrary evidence, the court presumes that governments do not 
act in bad faith and will not resume the alleged improper conduct.45 
2.  Injuries Capable of Repetition Yet Evading Review 
The court may find an injury capable of repetition yet evading 
review where the injury is of short duration and will always likely evade 
review46 or it is likely to recur because the plaintiff will likely be subject 
to the offending law again.47 In Moore v. Ogilvie, candidates challenged 
an Illinois statute that required candidates to file a petition signed by 
 
 37.  CHEMERINSKY, supra note 22, at 149. 
 38.  Knox v. SEIU, Local 1000, 567 U.S. 298, 307 (2012) (finding that the union is likely to 
resume the challenged practices because it defended the practice in its petition).  
 39.  City of Mesquite v. Aladdin’s Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283, 289 (1982) (weighing legislative 
reenactment of a different provision of the same law toward the possibility of reenacting the 
provision at issue). 
 40.  528 U.S. 167 (2000). 
 41.  Id. at 176.  
 42.  See id. at 184 (citing the pervasive nature of the conduct in the finding of injury-in-fact).  
 43.  Id. at 189.  
 44.  Id. (citing United States v. Concentrated Phosphate Exp. Ass’n, 393 U.S. 199, 203 
(1968)). 
 45.  Ne. Fla. Chapter of Ass’n Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 
677 (1993) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“Unlike in City of Mesquite, in the ordinary case it is not 
at all reasonable to suppose that the legislature has repealed or amended a challenged law simply 
to avoid litigation and that it will reinstate the original legislation if given the opportunity.”).   
 46.  See Press-Enter. Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal. for Riverside Cnty., 478 U.S. 1, 6 (1986) (holing 
case not moot because criminal proceedings are so short in duration that they evade review).  
 47.  Cal. Coastal Comm’n v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S. 572, 578 (1987) (finding injury 
capable of repetition but evading review because the mining company challenging the regulation 
would continue to be subject to the regulation as long as it kept operating). 
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at least 25,000 voters in order to be listed on an election ballot.48 The 
plaintiffs failed to obtain the requisite signatures and were 
consequently omitted from the 1968 ballot,49 and the relevant election 
occurred before the Court could hear the case.50 Although it was 
impossible to grant retrospective relief, the Court found that the 
challenged conduct was capable of repetition yet evading review 
because “the burden . . . placed on the nomination of candidates for 
statewide offices remain[ed] and control[ed] future elections.”51 
To assert its jurisdiction, the Court has also abandoned certain 
elements of this exception. Courts will hear cases alleging wrongs 
capable of repetition yet evading review where there is no reasonable 
expectation that the challenged conduct will persist and continue to 
harm the particular plaintiff,52 though articulated as a requirement.53 
Instead, courts reach the merits based on the “likelihood of recurrence 
to others.”54 In Gerstein v. Pugh,55 the “speculative possibility” of a 
named plaintiff’s rearrest, combined with the “certainty” that others 
would be subject to the same harmful procedures, sufficiently 
demonstrated the challenged conduct would likely reoccur.56 
3. Class Actions 
The class action exception allows courts to reach the merits of a 
class action even when the named class representative’s personal stake 
in the matter has become moot.57 The Court has reasoned that the class 
 
 48.  394 U.S. 814, 815 (1969).  
 49.  Id.  
 50.  Id. at 816. 
 51.  Id.  
 52.  See e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 125 (1973) (finding a right to abortion claim not 
moot because “[p]regnancy often comes more than once to the same woman, and in the general 
population, if man is to survive, it will always be with us”) (emphasis added); Dunn v. Blumstein, 
405 U.S. 330, 333 n.2 (1972) (stressing that “[a]lthough appellee now can vote, the problem to 
voters posed by the Tennessee residence requirements is capable of repetition, yet evading 
review”). 
 53.  See e.g., DeFunis v. Odegard, 416 U.S. 312, 319 (ruling that the injury was not capable 
of repetition yet evading review because plaintiff “will never again” be resubjected to the 
challenge conduct); Hall v. Beals, 396 U.S. 45, 49 (1969) (ruling that the possibility of being 
resubjected to the challenged conduct by moving and then reestablishing residence within two 
months of a presidential election was a “speculative contingenc[y]” that did not rise to a likelihood 
of recurrence).  
 54.  See e.g., Dunn, 405 U.S. at 333 n.2 (1972); Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814, 816 (1969) 
(finding the case not moot though plaintiffs could not be offered relief because the law controled 
future elections and will harm future candidates). 
 55.  420 U.S. 103 (1975).  
 56.  Id. at 111 n.11. 
 57.  Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 402 (1975) (affirming that class actions are not moot if a 
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of unnamed persons described in the certification takes on its own legal 
status, separate from that of the named plaintiff.58 On the basis of this 
independent interest in the outcome, a live controversy continues to 
exist for Article III purposes.59 
II. ISSUES INHERENT TO MOOTNESS DOCTRINE 
Within the broader mootness umbrella, there are two formulations 
of the doctrine: constitutional mootness and prudential mootness. 
Applying either constitutional or prudential reasoning in mootness 
yields inconsistent jurisdictional outcomes because each is animated by 
different concerns with and conceptions of judicial power. Thus, Section 
A addresses how both prudential and constitutional mootness 
conceptualize the role of the courts within our federalist system. 
Section B highlights the tensions resulting from the lack of a unitary 
mootness approach by juxtaposing two university affirmative action 
cases. 
A. The Source of Doctrinal Tension: The Prudential and 
Constitutional Mootness Distinction 
1. Constitutional Mootness 
The constitutional approach treats mootness as a mandatory bar to 
the exercise of jurisdiction.60 Article III’s language ultimately sets out 
defined parameters to judicial power that cannot be abrogated.61 
Accordingly, the Court cannot hear a case where there is no case or 
controversy defined in strict constitutional terms.62 
Several justices have adopted this narrow interpretation of the case 
or controversy requirement, emphasizing that historical limits to the 
Court’s power add color to the “case” and “controversy” requirement 
 
controversy exists between a named defendant and a member of the class though the named 
plaintiff’s claim is moot).  
 58.  Id. at 399.  
 59.  Id.  
 60.  See Liner v. Jafco, 375 U.S. 301, 306 n.3 (1964) (“Our lack of jurisdiction to review moot 
cases derives from the requirement of Article III of the Constitution under which the exercise of 
judicial power depends upon the existence of a case or controversy.”).  
 61.  Hall, supra note 1, at 574 (“The corollary to this constitutional understanding of 
mootness is that courts lack power to create exceptions to the mootness bar. Because the doctrine 
is a jurisdictional bar mandated by the Constitution, the constitutional text must determine the 
bounds of the doctrine.”).  
 62. Id. See also Honig, 484 U.S. 305, 341 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“I cannot believe that 
it is only our prudence, and nothing inherent in the [Constitution] that restrains us from 
pronouncing judgment . . . .”). 
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imposed by Article III.63 In Honig v. Doe, Justice Scalia emphasized in 
dissent that the “case or controversy” language is empty absent 
reference to traditional limitations on common law courts.64 For him, 
the terms “[j]udicial [p]ower,” “[c]ases,” and “[c]ontroversies,” import 
these historical limits on jurisdiction.65 Justice Frankfurter took a 
similar position: He argued that the “cases” and “controversies” 
language extends judicial power only to those matters traditionally 
decided by the courts of Westminster.66 He noted that the Framers 
drafted Article III with reference to “the familiar operations of the 
English judicial system and its manifestations . . . .”67 Consequently, 
these customs inform the meaning of Article III.68 
The Court first tethered mootness to the constitutional case or 
controversy requirement in Liner v. Jafco, Inc.69 In a footnote, the Court 
declared that its “lack of jurisdiction to review moot cases derives from 
. . . Article III . . . under which the exercise of judicial power depends 
upon the existence of a case or controversy.”70 Here, the Court went 
farther than previous commentary on the source of mootness doctrine 
and anchored its analysis directly to constitutional language.71 The 
Court’s proposition that a moot case is not a case or controversy in the 
constitutional sense has been accepted in subsequent opinions.72 
Proponents of the constitutional approach understand mootness 
exceptions as instances where, despite circumstantial changes, there 
remains a live controversy.73 The exceptions are not mootness doctrine 
 
 63.  See Honig, 484 U.S. at 340 (citing Justice Fields and the Framers to support the 
contention that the “case or controversy” requirement is defined by traditional limits on court 
power).  
 64.  Id.  
 65.  See id. (“Article III . . . adopts those limitations through terms (“The judicial Power;” 
“Cases;” “Controversies”) that have virtually no meaning except by reference to that tradition.”).  
 66.  Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 460 (1939).  
 67.  Id. 
 68.  Id.  
 69.  375 U.S. 301 (1964). Prior to Liner, mootness rested on common law principles barring 
courts’ from deciding cases where no dispute existed. Mootness in the Supreme Court, 88 HARV. 
L. REV. 373, 374 (1974) (citing Mills v. Green, 159 U.S. 651, 653 (1895)). The doctrine drew on 
efficiency and economy rationales, contending that the state should not “be burdened with the 
expense of trying such unsubstantial controversies.” Id. (citing Searcy v. Fayette Home Tel., 143 
Ky. 811, 812 (1911)). 
 70.  Liner, 375 U.S. at 306 n.3.   
 71.  Tsen Lee, supra note 24, at 612.  
 72.  See, e.g., DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 316 (1974) (per curiam); North Carolina v. 
Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246 (1971). 
 73.  See Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 341 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that Art. III 
“restrains us from pronouncing judgment in a case that the parties have settled, or a case involving 
a nonsurviving claim where the plaintiff has died, or a case where the law has been changed so 
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overrides; instead, they capture factual circumstances in which the 
Court has the constitutional power to exercise jurisdiction. According 
to Justice Scalia, “where the conduct has ceased . . . but there is a 
demonstrated probability that it will recur, a real-life controversy 
between parties with a personal stake in the outcome continues to 
exist” for Article III purposes.74 Thus, in those circumstances, judgment 
on the merits is no more problematic than an ordinary grant of relief.75 
2. Prudential Mootness 
The prudential approach recognizes that mootness is not 
constitutionally mandated and instead turns on practical concerns.76 
Prudential mootness does not ask whether the Court has the 
constitutional power to grant relief; rather, it emphasizes the Court’s 
discretion to exercise that power.77 Pursuant to this formulation, the 
Court may “stay[] its hand” when a non-moot controversy is best 
resolved by other branches of government.78 The Court treats such 
cases as moot for prudential reasons, not for failure to meet Article III 
requirements.79 In its application of this approach, the Court is 
motivated by the desire to conserve resources,80 preserve power,81 and 
 
that the basis of the dispute no longer exists, or a case where conduct sought to be enjoined has 
ceased and will not recur”). Note, Justice Scalia recognizes that the “yet evading review” prong 
of the capable of repetition yet evading review exception is prudential though the probability of 
reoccurrence is essential to jurisdiction. Id.  
 74.  Id.  
 75.  See id. (“Where the conduct has ceased for the time being but there is a demonstrated 
probability that it will recur, a real-life controversy between parties with a personal stake in the 
outcome continues to exist, and Art. III is no more violated than it is violated by entertaining a 
declaratory judgment action.”).   
 76.  See Chamber of Commerce v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 627 F.2d 289, 291 (D.C. Cir. 1980) 
(“In some circumstances, a controversy, not actually moot, is so attenuated that considerations of 
prudence and comity for coordinate branches of government counsel the court to stay its hand, 
and to withhold relief it has the power to grant.”).  
 77.  See Hall, supra note 1, at 564 (noting that prudential mootness treats dismissal as matters 
within the Court’s discretion).  
 78.  Chamber of Commerce, 627 F.2d at 291. 
 79.  United States v. (Under Seal), 757 F.2d 600, 603 (4th Cir. 1985).  
 80.  Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 191–92 
(2000) (holding that “[i]n contrast [to standing], by the time mootness is an issue, the case has 
been brought and litigated, often (as here) for years. To abandon the case at an advanced stage 
may prove more wasteful than frugal”); Deposit Guaranty Nat’l Bank, Jackson, Miss. v. Roper, 
445 U.S. 326, 339 (1980) (citing the inefficiency of bringing separate claims in its mootness 
determination).  
 81.  See, e.g., U.S. v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 302, 305 (1943) (holding a suit lacking sufficient 
adversity “does not assume the ‘honest and actual antagonistic assertion of rights’ to be 
adjudicated—a safeguard essential to the integrity of the judicial process”); Walling v. Reuter 
Co., 321 U.S. 671, 675–78 (1944) (ruling that defendant’s cessation of business and dissolution 
does not deprive the Court of the power to review appeals from the lower court judgment); Hall, 
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ensure that litigation is pursued by parties who are interested in the 
outcome and are properly motivated.82 
A proponent of prudential mootness, Chief Justice Rehnquist 
believed that mootness cannot be a constitutional doctrine because 
there are exceptions to it83 and because it is logically impossible to 
make exceptions to the Constitution.84 The Chief Justice further 
stressed that the connection between mootness and the Article III case 
or controversy requirement is “attenuated,” and “may be overridden 
where there are strong reasons” to do so.85 Rehnquist framed mootness 
as an “unwillingness to decide moot cases,” rather than an absolute 
impediment to jurisdiction.86 Consistent with this permissive view, he 
proposed a new mootness exception grounded in efficiency:87 The 
Court should hear moot cases where significant resources have already 
been expended and the Court could have reached the merits but for a 
change of circumstance.88 
B.  Current Mootness Doctrine Treats Similar Cases Dissimilarly 
Because the Court nevertheless hears cases that are moot, the 
Court has approached mootness in a way that is neither consistently 
constitutional or nor consistently prudential.89 Rather, the doctrine has 
evolved into a chimera of both; mootness is highly malleable. This 
section explicates the practical reasons that drive the hodge-podge 
mootness framework and applies these principles to two similarly 
situated plaintiffs. 
 
supra note 1, at 568 n.21 (citing Coxe v. Phillips, 95 Eng. Rep. R. 152, 152 (1736)) (holding that 
attempt to conduct fictitious action was contempt of court). 
 82.  Waite v. Dowley, 94 U.S. 527, 534 (1876) (“This court does not sit here to try moot cases 
to solve a question which may never be raised by any party entitled to raise it.”). See also Hall, 
supra note 1, at 570 (noting that courts applying prudential mootness historically considered 
“judicially economy, avoidance of party gamesmanship, and the desirability of resolving issues 
that were both substantively important and likely to recur” and consistently applied this 
framework until Liner).  
 83.  Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 330 (1988) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (“If it were indeed 
Art. III which . . . underlies the mootness doctrine, the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” 
exception relied upon by the Court in this case would be incomprehensible.”). 
 84.  Id.  
 85.  Id. at 331. 
 86.  Id.  
 87.  Id. at 332.  
 88.  Id. 
 89.  See Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 756 n.8 (1976) (highlighting a set of 
mootness rules rooted in policy, rather the constitution). See also Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 97 
(1968) (noting the “subtle pressures which cause policy considerations to blend into the 
constitutional limitations of Article III”).  
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Some constitutional law scholars like Erwin Chemerinsky,90 
Alexander Bickel,91 and David O’Brien92 see justiciability doctrines 
like mootness as malleable tools to skirt (or confront) important social 
and political questions. Further, to encourage state experimentation 
with social policy, the Court exploits justiciability to avoid commenting 
on new laws.93 By the same token, the Court may also avoid confronting 
the merits of politically divisive cases to safeguard and cultivate its 
legitimacy.94 Within the separation of powers framework, the Court 
lacks the powers to implement its decisions,95 so to ensure compliance 
with a particular decision, the Court must be able to compel 
compliance generally through its image and prestige.96 
Moreover, the constitutional and prudential mootness distinction 
can be outcome determinative if the case is technically moot but there 
are compelling prudential reasons to hear the case anyway.97  Two cases, 
Defunis v. Odegaard and Fisher v. University of Texas (II), show how 
the doctrine’s lack of a unitary theoretical approach produces disparate 
outcomes. DeFunis v. Odegaard98 typifies the ways in which 
uncertainties in the doctrine can be manipulated to produce desired 
outcomes. DeFunis marked the first time that the Court took a case 
challenging a university’s affirmative action admissions policy. In 
DeFunis, a white man denied law school admission under an 
affirmative action policy alleged discriminated in violation of the Equal 
Protection Clause.99 DeFunis consequently sought an injunction 
commanding the school to admit him.100 But by the time of the Court’s 
review, DeFunis had been accepted to that law school and was in his 
 
 90.  Erwin Chemerinsky, A Unified Approach to Justiciability, 22 CONN. L. REV. 677, 682 
(1990) (noting that outcomes can turn on the Court’s characterization of the justiciability issue). 
 91.  EVAN TSEN LEE, JUDICIAL RESTRAINT IN AMERICA 157 (1st ed. 2011).  
 92.  DAVID M. O’BRIEN, STORM CENTER: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN POLITICS 
183 (Aaron Javsicas eds., 9th ed. 2011).  
 93.  TSEN LEE, supra note 91, at 157. 
 94.  See Deborah Hellman, The Importance of Appearing Principled, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 1108, 
1139 (1995) (noting the Court’s efforts to maintain its institutional prestige).  
 95.  See O’BRIEN, supra note 92, at 27 (emphasizing that early abortion cases forced the 
Court to confront its limited power as “a political institution whose legitimacy is nonetheless 
perceived to depend largely on symbolism and reality of judicial independence”); see also id. at 
337 (highlighting the Court’s failed attempts to implement immediate and widespread school 
desegregation); id. at 314 (“Denied the power of the sword or the purse, the Court must cultivate 
its institutional prestige.”).  
 96.  Hellman, supra note 94, at 1139. 
 97.  Hall, supra note 1, at 589.  
 98.  416 U.S. 312 (1974) (per curiam).   
 99.  Id. at 314.  
 100.  Id.  
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third year.101 
The Court held that because DeFunis would “receive his diploma 
regardless of any decision this Court might reach on the merits,”102 he 
had been accorded precisely the remedy he sought—admission to that 
law school.103 And because DeFunis had secured the relief he had 
sought, “the controversy between the parties clearly ceased to be 
‘definite and concrete’ and no longer ‘touch[ed] the legal relations of 
parties having adverse legal interests.’”104 Thus, the Court held that the 
case was moot.105 
Cognizant of the mootness issue when the Court granted certiorari, 
the liberal justices had intended to reach the merits and validate 
affirmative action in universities.106 However, Justice Powell held the 
swing vote and took a more centrist position than the other liberals, 
joining the conservative majority bloc.107 He may have been deferring 
to the political process to normalize affirmative action, searching for a 
better case to advance his position, or buying time to refine his 
position.108 Nevertheless, assured that DeFunis would be able to 
graduate,109 the Court punted on a politically charged question and 
“announced a new principle: ‘Difficult cases are moot.’”110 
In this case, the Court framed the mootness inquiry in 
constitutional terms, first affirming the doctrine’s constitutional 
moorings.111 The Court held that “the inability of the federal judiciary 
‘to review moot cases derives from the requirement of Article III of the 
Constitution under which the exercise of judicial power depends upon 
the existence of a case or controversy.’”112 The Court elaborated that 
“[t]he starting point for [mootness] analysis is the familiar proposition 
that ‘federal courts are without power to decide questions that cannot 
 
 101.  Id. at 315.  
 102.  Id. at 317.  
 103.  Id.  
 104.  Id. Importantly, DeFunis did not seek class certification so the class action exception 
could not save his case from dismissal on mootness grounds. Id. at 314. 
 105.  Id. at 320–21.  
 106.  TSEN LEE, supra note 91, at 158. 
 107.  Id.  
 108.  Id.  
 109.  Id. (“That [DeFunis would graduate from law school] was all the conservatives and 
Powell wanted to hear.”).  
 110.  CHEMERINSKY, supra note 36, at 123 (quoting DAVID CURRIE, FEDERAL COURTS: 
CASES AND MATERIALS 77 n.3 (4th ed. 1990)). 
 111.  DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 316 (1974) (per curiam) (citing Liner v. Jafco, Inc., 
375 U.S. 301, 306 n.3 (1964), the seminal case wedding mootness to the Constitution).  
 112.  Id. (citing Liner v. Jafco, Inc., 375 U.S. 301, 306 n.3 (1964)) (emphasis added).  
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affect the rights of litigants in the case before them.’”113 Limiting 
jurisdiction to cases where there is concrete adversity and shying away 
from abstract questions of politics and policy,114 the Court tethered 
mootness rules to the “[c]onstitutional limits”115 articulated in standing 
decisions. On its face, this framing rejects prudential mootness: If 
mootness is “derive[d]” from constitutional requirements and 
“depends on the existence of a case or controversy,” jurisdiction cannot 
turn on prudential concerns like sunken litigation costs or threats to 
court power. Prudential concerns are extra-constitutional by definition. 
However, the Court deviated from this constitutional articulation 
of mootness in Fisher v. University of Texas II,116 relaxing the doctrine 
“as only a prudential model of mootness would permit.”117 In that case, 
the Court reached the merits of a university affirmative action case and 
did not raise the mootness question.118 Like DeFunis, plaintiff Abigail 
Fisher sought injunctive and declaratory relief compelling the 
university to reconsider her application on a race-blind basis.119 She too 
did not seek class certification and had graduated from another 
university before the Court could hear the case.120 Already a graduate, 
the Court’s ruling would have had no real effect on Fisher, just as a 
ruling would have had no real effect on DeFunis. Because DeFunis and 
Fisher were similarly situated, DeFunis should have controlled and 
Fisher should not have presented a live controversy. Nevertheless, the 
Court reached the merits and upheld the university’s policy, ruling that 
the affirmative action policy was narrowly tailored to a compelling 
state interest in promoting diversity in higher education.121 
On highly similar facts, DeFunis and Fisher II reached vastly 
different outcomes. The Court erected a high mootness bar in DeFunis 
yet bulldozed that mootness barrier in Fisher II. Absent a consistent 
and clear approach to mootness, the Court may manipulate mootness 
 
 113.  Id.  
 114.  The Court declined to comment on the state of affirmative action. See id. at 318 
(generally noting the “public interest in having the legality of the practices settled” in cases of 
voluntary cessation without specific mention of affirmative action).  
 115.  Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 756 (1984).  
 116.  Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016).  
 117.  Hall, supra note 1, at 589. 
 118.  Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2214 (upholding the school’s policy because it satisfied strict 
scrutiny).  
 119.  Brief for Respondent at 13, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016) (No. 
14-981), 2015 WL 6467640. 
 120.  Id. at 18 (arguing that plaintiff’s claim is moot because she had graduated from LSU and 
did not seek class certification).  
 121.  Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2214.   
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doctrine to reach or avoid questions of constitutional and normative 
import. This is where NYSRPA, had it constitutionalized mootness, 
could have injected consistency and predictability into the doctrine and 
where it failed. 
III.  STANDING 
To reiterate, standing and mootness are often inextricably linked in 
a court’s jurisdiction determination. Like mootness, standing has been 
parsed for prudential and constitutional elements. Over time, the Court 
has mislabeled elements of standing, characterizing as “prudential” 
elements better understood as constitutional. The Court recently cast 
doubt on prudential standing in Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static 
Control Components, Inc.122 In Lexmark, the Court reaffirmed 
standing’s constitutional roots, emphasizing that standing rules derive 
from courts’ limited power to decide “cases” and “controversies” and 
separation of powers principles.123 From these principles, the Court 
noted that it has distilled requirements that comprise a “irreducible 
constitutional minimum of standing.”124 These standing requirements 
cannot be abrogated and, thus, the Court rejected the notion that it 
could reach the merits on prudential grounds.125 The Court was clear 
that separation of powers limits federal court jurisdiction to only those 
cases pleading a particular injury to a personal right caused by the 
defendant,126 a principle that runs through standing cases127 and is 
helpful in understanding the concerns driving the Court’s recent 
mootness decisions. 
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONAL-PRUDENTIAL DISTINCTION & NYSRPA 
The constitutional/prudential mootness distinction can be outcome 
determinative if the case is moot but there are compelling reasons to 
reach the merits.128 In the subset of cases where the distinction is 
determinative, courts can relax the doctrine to hear the case. “[W]hen 
 
 122.  572 U.S. 118, 127 (2014) (“Although we admittedly have placed [the “zone of interests”] 
test under the “prudential” rubric in the past, it does not belong there . . . .”).  
 123.  Id. at 125.  
 124.  Id.  
 125.  Id. at 128 (“We do not ask whether in our judgment Congress should have authorized 
Static Control’s suit, but whether Congress in fact did so.”).  
 126.  Id. at 125.  
 127.  See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (emphasizing that separation of 
powers principles delineate the role of the judiciary and define justiciability doctrine).  
 128.  Hall, supra note 1, at 589.  
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prudential factors strongly favor hearing a moot claim, courts find a 
way to hear the claim, even at the expense of distorting the doctrine”129 
—and predictability. NYSRPA falls within this subset of cases given the 
heated political discourse surrounding the underlying Second 
Amendment claim. Accordingly, this part (1) argues that the Court’s 
mootness approach would have determined NYSRPA’s outcome, (2) 
analyzes the per curiam opinion for evidence of either constitutional or 
prudential mootness, revealing both a constitutional framing and 
analysis of mootness rules, and (3) parses the dissent and uncovers only 
a facially constitutionalized argument. 
A. Why the Constitutional-Prudential Mootness Distinction Matters 
As a close and politically charged case, NYSRPA falls within the 
subset of cases where the distinction is outcome determinative. In 
NYSRPA, New York City residents challenged the City’s prohibition 
on transport to non-City secondary homes and shooting ranges.130 
Three months after the Court granted certiorari, the City amended its 
ordinance to allow licensed firearms transport to non-City secondary 
homes and shooting ranges.131 New York State then enacted a law 
barring cities from restricting licensed transport outside the city.132 In 
response to these developments, the City filed a Suggestion of 
Mootness with the Court.133 Both parties presented compelling 
arguments as to whether the voluntary cessation exception applied.134 
Petitioners contended that the City continued to micromanage their 
Second Amendment rights; thus, they argued that reassurances the City 
would not revert to the old regulations were suspect.135 Rather than 
admit error,136 the City cited the New York state law preempting 
 
 129.  Id.  
 130.  N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. City of New York, 86 F. Supp. 3d 249, 257 
(S.D.N.Y. 2015), aff’d sub nom. N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. City of New York, 883 
F.3d 45 (2d Cir. 2018), vacated and remanded sub nom. N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. 
City of New York, 140 S. Ct. 1525 (2020). 
 131.  38 R.C.N.Y. § 5-23(a)(3) (2019). 
 132.  N.Y. Penal Law § 400.00(6) (2019). 
 133.  Suggestion of Mootness, supra note 14. 
 134.  See Resp. to Respondents’ Suggestion of Mootness at 22–23, N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol 
Ass’n, Inc. v. City of New York, 883 F.3d 45 (2019) (No. 18-280), 2019 WL 35458533451573. See 
also Suggestion of Mootness, supra note 14, at 19. 
 135.  See Resp. to Respondent’s Suggestion of Mootness, supra note 143, at 26 (“The City’s 
postcertiorari efforts to insulate its actions from this Court’s review thus provide no comfort 
whatsoever that it would not revert to its past ways once the threat of this Court’s review has 
passed . . . .”).  
 136.  Id. at 25. 
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inconsistent city laws.137 Because the City did not admit error, 
Petitioners argued that the change in City and State law was a product 
“of an acknowledged City-orchestrated effort to frustrate this Court’s 
review”138 and the Court could not be sure that the City would not 
reinstate its policy. Petitioners stressed that, in light of the dubious 
circumstances of the City’s repeal and State’s amendment, the City 
could not “begin to meet its heavy burden of proving that it is 
‘absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not 
reasonably be expected to recur.’”139 Therefore, Petitioners conclude 
that the voluntarily cessation exception applied.140 Respondents argued 
that the voluntary cessation exception did not apply because the newly 
adopted State law provided for the transport of firearms outside the 
city and barred the City from passing rules inconsistent with state 
law.141 So even if the City wanted to reinstate the old regulations, New 
York State law would prevent it from doing so.142 
Further, pressing prudential considerations weighed in favor of a 
judgment on the merits. Justices Alito,143 Gorsuch,144 Thomas,145 and 
Kavanaugh146 stressed the need to address the Second Amendment 
claim, highlighting that the Court has yet to address lower courts’ 
uneven applications of District of Columbia v. Heller.147 Justices Alito, 
Gorsuch, and Thomas further emphasized the need to protect the 
Court’s power and docket, arguing that the City’s attempt to supplant 
the old regulations while the case was pending review “permits [the 
Court’s] docket to be manipulated in a way that should not be 
countenanced.”148 
 
 137.  Id. at 28.  
 138.  Id.  
 139.  Id. at 30 (citing Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 
719 (2007)).  
 140.  See id. at 33 (arguing that the City has failed to show mootness where there is voluntary 
cessation).  
 141.  Suggestion of Mootness, supra note 14, at 17. Voluntary cessation doctrine requires a 
showing that the legislature will return to the old policy. See id. (clarifying that a party cannot 
evade judicial review by temporarily altering its behavior).  
 142.  Id. at 19.  
 143.  N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. City of New York, 140 S. Ct. 1525, 1527 (2020) 
(Alito, J., dissenting).   
 144.  Id.  
 145.  Id.  
 146.  Id. (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).  
 147.  See 554 U.S. 570, 581 (2008) (holding that the “Second Amendment right is exercised 
individually and belongs to all Americans”). 
 148.  N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc., 140 S. Ct. at 1527 (Alito, J., dissenting).   
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B.  NYSRPA and Theories of Mootness 
The NYSRPA majority decision is an exercise of constitutional 
mootness—the Court’s language and reasoning evince as much. Where 
the language in NYSRPA is lacking, the Court’s standing jurisprudence 
sheds light on the current state of mootness as articulated in NYSRPA. 
Certain parallels between the justiciability doctrines’ animating 
concerns indicate that mootness doctrine, like standing, is 
constitutional at its core. Standing in particular suffers from the same 
infirmity as mootness: It too muddies the waters and mischaracterizes 
constitutional concerns as prudential.149 Despite the muddled labels, 
standing jurisprudence focuses on whether plaintiffs “present[] issues 
with sufficient concrete adverseness to those whose invocation of the 
power of judicial review is most consistent with the constitutional 
premises regarding the proper role of the federal judiciary.”150 This 
section shows that NYSRPA was animated by the same fundamental 
concerns. 
Recall, that in NYSRPA: (1) Petitioners sought injunctive and 
declaratory relief from the City’s old ordinance,151 (2) because the City 
rule was replaced, Petitioners had obtained to the precise relief they 
sought,152 (3) granted the precise relief sought, there was no longer an 
injury caused by an adverse party for which the Court could provide a 
remedy.153 
The first question is whether NYSRPA evinces either a 
constitutional or prudential approach to mootness. In its articulation of 
the mootness framework, the Court cited constitutionalized mootness 
rules,154 suggesting that the Court meant to import a constitutional view 
of mootness, though this alone is not dispositive.155 Importantly, the 
Court did not explicitly ground its articulation of mootness rules in 
 
 149.  See Floyd C. Douglas, Justiciability Decisions of the Burger Court, 60 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 862, 869–70 (1985). 
 150.  Id. at 882.  
 151.  N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc., 140 S. Ct. at 1526 (majority).  
 152.  Id.  
 153.  See id. (ruling that Petitioners have the “precise” relief they sought in their complaint).  
 154.  Id. at 1527. 
 155.  The Court cites Lewis v. Cont’l Bank Corp. and Differender v. Cent. Baptist Church. 
Lewis grounded the Court’s jurisdiction in Article III, limiting jurisdiction to disputes in which “a 
litigant must have suffered, or be threatened with, an actual injury traceable to the defendant and 
likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” 494 U.S. 472, 475–76 (1990). Differender 
likewise couched mootness as a mandatory bar to jurisdiction, requiring the existence of a 
controversy to exercise jurisdiction. See 404 U.S. 412, 414 (1972) (ruling that the case “lost its 
character as a present, live controversy of the kind that must exist if we are to avoid advisory 
opinions”) (emphasis added).  
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Article III or reference the case or controversy requirement, which are 
typically hallmarks of a constitutional mootness approach.156 But nor 
did the majority reference prudential concerns such as courts’ equitable 
powers, efficiency, and judicial economy.157 So because the opinion itself 
provided few explicit clues as to the proper approach to mootness, the 
Court’s formulation of standing doctrine may provide insight. 
The parallels between mootness and standing reveal a 
constitutional theory of mootness. Although NYSRPA did not 
explicitly nod to the injury-in-fact requirement, the reasoning turned 
on a lack of injury caused by an adverse party. In ruling that the 
amended local and state laws, which allowed for transport to non-City 
second homes and shooting ranges, had provided Petitioners the 
precise relief they sought,158 the Court indirectly ruled that Petitioners 
no longer suffered from the alleged injury. Thus, like constitutional 
standing decisions, NYSRPA hinged on the existence of a legally 
defined injury to a personal right. Again, like constitutional standing, 
NYSRPA denied court access to plaintiffs who did not plead sufficient 
concrete adverseness and echoed the Court’s understanding of the 
judiciary’s limited constitutional role. 
Further, the Court’s treatment of the new ordinance was consistent 
with broader constitutional standing precedent. In NYSRPA, the 
record was not sufficiently developed to ascertain the injury to 
Petitioners’ Second Amendment rights.159 The “continuous and 
uninterrupted” provision was not briefed and, as the record stood 
before the Court, the provision’s meaning and the City’s enforcement 
procedures remained unknown. Without this crucial information, it was 
not clear how and to what extent the City’s new rule had injured or 
would injure petitioners. Consequently, as the record stood, petitioners 
did not allege injuries directly caused by the adverse party. Here too, 
NYSRPA represented another instance in which the Court refused to 
grant petitioners relief for want of concrete adverseness. 
Much like the Court’s constitutional standing cases, quintessentially 
prudential concerns did not animate NYSRPA. There was no reference 
 
 156.  See N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc., 140 S. Ct. 1525 (failing to cite Art. III in 
articulation of mootness rules). 
 157.  See id. (omitting reference to court power or litigation costs). 
 158.  Id.  
 159.  See id. (noting that, where plaintiffs have not had the opportunity to bring a claim under 
the new law, the Court vacates so that parties can amend pleadings and develop the record) (citing 
Lewis v. Cont’l Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 482–83 (1990)).  
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to efficiency or sunk litigation costs. Justice Rehnquist found the 
economy rationale particularly persuasive where significant resources 
were spent to appeal to the highest court and the obstacle to review 
was a change in factual circumstances.160 NYSRPA fit squarely within 
Rehnquist’s criteria because it reached the highest court—SCOTUS—
and a change in the law precluded review. But in spite of prudential 
considerations, the Court did not find injuries or damages under either 
the old or new ordinance and held the case to be moot. In this respect, 
the opinion rejected prudential reasoning. 
In the face of strong prudential and practical policy concerns that 
weighed in favor of a judgment on the merits, the Court stuck to its 
constitutional guns. And although the Second Amendment issue was 
likely compounded by the impending presidential election, potential 
changes to the Court’s composition,161 and media coverage of police 
brutality and mass shootings, the Court addressed none of these 
considerations.162 Furthermore, the case presented an opportunity to 
clarify Heller, as the dissent would have preferred.163 The original 
ordinance was the first law of its kind,164  and no other state has enacted 
such stringent laws regulating the transport of firearms.165 Yet, the 




 160.  Nichol, supra note 7, at 705.  
 161.  Justice Amy Coney Barret was confirmed in October 2020. Nicholas Fandos, Senate 
Confirms Barrett, Delivering for Trump and Reshaping the Court, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 26, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/26/us/politics/senate-confirms-barrett.html.  
 162.  Jill Cowan, Amy Harmon, & Nicholas Bogel-Burroughs, Santa Clara Shooting is 
Another Nightmare Made Real, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/14/us/school-shooting-santa-clarita.html. See also Adam 
Liptak, N.Y. TIMES, After School Shooting, Bill Focuses on Banks and Guns, N.Y. TIMES, (Oct. 
6, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/15/business/dealbook/banks-gun-crime.html (“The 
[C]ourt is going to have to decide this question of mootness against the backdrop of several recent 
highly-publicized episodes of gun violence and heated debate between the two parties about 
solutions to gun violence.”). 
 163.  N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc., 140 S. Ct. at 1527 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 164.  Robert Barnes, New York Eased Gun Law Hopeful Supreme Court Would Drop Second 
Amendment Case — But That Hasn’t Happened Yet, WASH. POST (Aug. 11, 2019), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/new-york-eased-gun-law-hopeful-supreme-
court-would-drop-second-amendment-case—but-that-hasnt-happened-yet/2019/08/10/9031682e-
bab6-11e9-a091-6a96e67d9cce_story.html (“The New York restrictions were unique — no other 
jurisdiction has such strict rules on transporting a weapon.”). 
 165.  Id.  
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C. The Dissent and Mootness166 
Although Justice Alito purported to engage with constitutional 
mootness,167 the dissent is actually animated by prudential concerns. 
Justice Alito emphasized the Court’s long silence on Heller168 and the 
need to address lower courts’ uneven applications of that precedent.169 
The dissent also regarded silence on the Second Amendment issue as 
an affront to the Court’s power and legitimacy. Alito further stressed 
the need to protect the Court’s power and docket, arguing that by 
amending the old regulations while the case was pending review, the 
City had effectively manipulated the Court’s docket.170 
The injury analysis in particular was by belied by a desire to reach 
the merits. Justice Alito grounded his analysis of the injury and request 
for relief in terms of harms caused by the new ordinance’s “continuous 
and uninterrupted” transport requirement.171 Focusing on how the 
“continuous and uninterrupted transport requirement” infringes on the 
Second Amendment right, Justice Alito reached the merits based on an 
injury Petitioners did not allege. Petitioners, as the majority noted, did 
not have the opportunity to challenge the “continuous and 
uninterrupted” transport requirement.172 Rather, Petitioners sought the 
right to transport their firearms to non-City second homes and shooting 
ranges because the old ordinance categorically barred them from doing 
 
 166.  This paper will focus on the dissent because the concurrence reaches the same 
constitutional understanding of the doctrine. N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc., 140 S. Ct. at 
1527 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). 
 167.  Justice Alito acknowledged that mootness acts as a constitutional bar to jurisdiction: 
“Under the Constitution, our authority is limited to deciding actual cases or controversies, and if 
this were no longer a live controversy—that is, if it were now moot—we would be compelled to 
dismiss.” Id. (Alito, J., dissenting). He explicitly noted that mootness is rooted in the case or 
controversy requirement. Id. Couching the existence of a live controversy as “compelling” the 
mootness outcome, Justice Alito also rejected the view that mootness is a matter of discretion as 
prudential mootness suggests. Id.  
 168.  See 554 U.S. 570, 581 (2008) (holding that the “Second Amendment right is exercised 
individually and belongs to all Americans”). 
 169.  N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc., 140 S. Ct. at 1527 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring); id. 
(Alito, J., dissenting).  
 170.  Id. (Alito, J., dissenting).  
 171.  See id. at 1531 (characterizing the relief sought as unrestricted access to second homes 
and shooting ranges outside the city); see also id. at 1534–35 (finding that the less restrictive City 
rule did not remedy the injury because it did not provide unrestricted access).  
 172.  See id. at 1526 (majority) (ruling that “where the mootness is attributable to a change in 
the legal framework governing the case, and where the plaintiff may have some residual claim 
under the new framework that was understandably not asserted previously, our practice is to 
vacate the judgment and remand for further proceedings in which the parties may, if necessary, 
amend their pleadings or develop the record more fully”) (citing Diffenderfer v. Central Baptist 
Church of Miami, Inc., 404 U.S. 412, 415 (1972)). 
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so. 173 The new City and State amendments specifically provided for 
such a right.174 Ultimately, because he did not apply a recognized 
exception to mootness doctrine, reaching the merits based on this 
reframing of the injury deviates from traditional constitutionalized 
mootness requirements. 
V.  DISCUSSION 
To reach the merits of important cases, the Court has advanced 
inconsistent reasoning. The need to adhere to precedent, combined 
with the fact that certiorari was granted because several justices wanted 
to reach the merits, has made the Court say “very silly and indefensible 
things.”175 Indeed, the Court’s application of the mootness doctrine has 
undermined both the consistency and predictability of outcomes and 
the legitimacy of the Court itself.176 To point to a few notable examples, 
Roe and DeFunis represent “dramatic variations in jurisdictional 
analysis.”177 When suitable, “[t]the Supreme Court lowers the mootness 
barrier to reach an abortion issue [in Roe] or bolsters it to put 
affirmative action on hold” in Defunis.178 Because the Court 
manipulates mootness to reach (or, in certain cases, avoid) the merits, 
doctrine does not actually drive the analysis in cases where the 
approach—constitutional or prudential—is outcome determinative.179 
The NYSRPA majority and dissent suffer from the same 
inconsistency as DeFunis and Fisher II. The majority in Fisher II neither 
cited prudential considerations nor applied a recognized mootness 
exception to reach the merits. Declining to apply a mootness exception, 
the Fisher II Court relied on ordinary justiciability principles to decide 
the merits. Applying fundamental mootness doctrine, no principled 
reasons—other than underlying prudential considerations—accounted 
for jurisdictional differences in DeFunis and Fisher II. Similarly, the 
NYSRPA majority and dissent did not expressly reference prudential 
concerns or apply the mootness exceptions; rather both purported to 
apply fundamental—and constitutional—principles and, yet, the 
majority and dissent came down on the mootness question differently. 
 
 173.  Id.  
 174.  See id. (holding Petitioners had access to the precise relief sought).  
 175.  Nichol, supra note 7, at 708.  
 176.  See Hall, supra note 1, at 564 (“[M]ootness does not provide the analytical tools 
necessary to explain or predict the results in a large number of mootness cases.”).  
 177.  Nichol, supra note 7, at 713.  
 178.  Id. at 714.  
 179.  See Hall, supra note 1, at 564.  
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In NYSRPA, the difference in jurisdictional outcomes intimated that, 
while the dissent appeared to engage in constitutional reasoning, 
Justice Alito’s was actually animated by prudential concerns. 
Clarifying the correct approach to mootness would inject the 
predictability the doctrine desperately needs. Whether the Court 
affirms constitutional or prudential mootness, justices, judges, and 
scholars alike can work through a set of defined concerns and 
questions. With prudential mootness comes a distinct set of practical 
concerns (cost, efficiency, economy) and exceptions (the traditional 
exceptions to mootness). There is a limited universe of concerns that 
matter to the Court. Scholars and judges may make educated and 
reasoned assessments as to the weight the Court would assign to a 
particular concern based on other decisions, dicta, and the current 
sociopolitical climate. From these sources, we can ascertain what 
matters to a particular Court at a particular time and predict the 
outcome of a prudential mootness determination. 
Though prudential mootness is not wholly unwieldy and provides 
flexibility to the Court to address partisan and politically charged 
constitutional claims, the constitutional approach to mootness brings 
added certainty and clarity, eliminating discretion from mootness 
determinations. Because constitutional mootness is constitutionally 
grounded, it sets out strict and clear parameters to guide courts, 
whereas prudential mootness looks to practical considerations and is a 
squishier rule. Proponents of prudential mootness may respond that 
flexibility allows the Court to track public opinion and remain 
accountable. Yet, flexibility and discretion are the source of doctrinal 
confusion. The Court ought not “lower[] the mootness barrier to reach 
an abortion issue or bolster[] it to put affirmative action on hold”180 at 
the expense of theoretical consistency. Individual justices may weigh 
the costs spent on litigation, potential effects on courts’ power or reach, 
and the importance of the underlying constitutional challenge very 
differently, particularly in close cases. Given their malleability, these 
factors may do little to discipline analyses. NYSRPA, had it affirmed 
constitutional mootness, could have served this disciplinary function 
and clarified the concerns and requirements underlying mootness 
inquiries. 
 
 180.  Nichol, supra note 7, at 714.   
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CONCLUSION 
Prudential and constitutional mootness are always the foundation 
of mootness decisions. The Court has used both approaches and its 
uneven treatment of mootness questions has resulted in an inconsistent 
and unpredictable framework. Thus, to better understand the 
animating concerns undergirding mootness decisions, we must look to 
other justiciability doctrines. Standing provides some insight. Though 
the Court has mislabeled elements of standing, decisions appear to be 
grounded in constitutional rather than prudential concerns.181 A closer 
look at mootness cases reveals a similar trend. Like standing, mootness 
decisions evidence principled discussions of constitutional 
requirements. NYSRPA is no outlier. Like recent mootness decisions, 
NYSRPA is an exercise in constitutional reasoning, focused on whether 
there is an injury for which the Court may offer relief within its 
constitutionally mandated role. Looking to the future of mootness 
doctrine, NYSRPA was a missed opportunity to clarify the proper 
theoretical approach to mootness and ground the doctrine in a 
predictable set of constitutionalized rules. Still, NYSRPA could serve 
as a springboard to affirm constitutional mootness, given the majority’s 
distinctly constitutional tone and result. 
 
 181.  See Douglas, supra note 158, at 882 (“The driving force of most of the Burger Court’s 
significant justiciability decisions is not a concern with assuring the presentation of issues in a 
form suitable for judicial resolution, but a preoccupation with questions of separation of powers 
and federalism.”).  
